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Abstract
Abstract. In this paper we review the literature on civil conflict and development with an angle on the
socio-economic consequences of violence and promising policies for fostering peace. We make four main points.
First, we show that one of the reasons why conflict is still often overlooked as key factor for development is
that conflict costs are typically under-estimated, which is in particular the case for shadow costs of deterrence.
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for breaking these traps, policies must be calibrated such as to address jointly both poverty and social tensions,
there being a strong macro complementarity between peace and development objectives. We document how
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novel data collection methodologies and the need of policy evaluation tools in violent context.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, the world has experienced an increase in the number of violent intra-state conflicts.
Reported battle-related deaths reached in 2014 their highest numbers recorded in 20 years (Allansson
et al. (2017)). As hotspots of violence are typically located in low-income countries, the question of the
two-way causation between poverty and conflict has been deeply scrutinized in the recent academic
literature. Unfortunately, the policy aspects have been widely over-looked in spite of their paramount
importance. This is regrettable because pacification is a subtle and complex process where both
economic and political considerations matter: Policies that combat poverty do not automatically
eradicate conflict, and can spectacularly backfire when they fail to take into account conflict dynamics.
Drawing on the existing literature reviewed below, the current paper formulates four key messages.
First, the literature is likely to underestimate the actual costs of conflict. The main reason is that, in
many contexts, the mere risk of conflict entails costly actions that ultimately prevent conflict. Hence,
the quantitative assessment of these, often very substantial, costs of prevention is challenging because
conflict remains an off-equilibrium threat and won’t appear in the datasets on conflict incidence. Another
reason for under-estimating is that most quantitative studies focus on the visible and measurable costs,
namely material damages, that are relatively short-term. By contrast, a full range of costs –from
depleted social capital to generation-specific scars (education, mental health, labor-market prospects)–
are much harder to price in spite of being pervasive for a longer time period. Put differently, destroyed
buildings and roads are quick to reconstruct and the incurred price of reconstruction is tangible;
mending the social fabric of a society torn apart by violence is an open problem for which reliable
price estimates are typically missing. Second, we identify a series of war-traps where self-reinforcing
dynamics lead to vicious cycles of poverty and violence. Most prominently, conflicts deteriorate
material conditions and social ties, which in turn constitute a powerful breading ground for future
violence. Hence, studying the question on the "impact of conflict on development" without taking into
consideration such self-reinforcing dynamics may lead to seriously wrong conclusions. Third, the policy
response should be calibrated such as to address jointly the peace and development objectives since
there exists a strong macro complementarity between them. In particular, it would be a mistake to
believe that the toolkit of anti-poverty policies will mechanically and automatically translate into a
reduction of violence and social tensions. On the contrary, economic policies should be complemented
with political and institutional interventions –taking on board lessons from political science. This also
calls for a more integrative development model with "no-one left behind" in terms of territories and
population segments. Our fourth message is that the evaluation of development policies in violent
context should be encouraged. In particular, this macro-complementarity calls for the use of structural
models that enable to quantify counterfactual interventions and the extent of general equilibrium
feedback effects – which makes them a crucial complement to other study designs such as randomized
control trials and (quasi-)natural experiments.
While there exists several surveys studying the general drivers and consequences of war (see e.g.
Blattman and Miguel (2010)), the current review is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind
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focusing specifically on the developmental consequences of political violence, its associated conflict
traps and the appropriate policy responses.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We start in Section 2 to present an array of overall
cost estimates of armed conflict, before discussing in Section 3 the channels at work through which
conflicts deploy their main effects. Section 4 describes how the aforementioned consequences of fighting
can give birth to vicious cycles and war traps. In Section 5 we discuss particular policies that have
the potential to break the aforementioned traps and we provide a perspective for the evolution of
the research field, highlighting the role of external validity and quantitative models of conflict and
development. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Estimates of overall costs of war
2.1 Stylized facts on conflicts
To start with, we briefly outlay some well-known facts on the prevalence of different types of conflict.
From the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Themnér and Wallensteen (2012)) we see that between
1946 and 2019, about 76 percent of all wars were civil conflicts, and only 10 percent either interstate or
colonial (extrasystemic) wars, with the remainder being hybrid internationalized civil wars. In terms
of evolution, since 1946 there has been an upward trend in civil wars from 8 per year in 1946 to 30 per
year in 2019, and over this time period also internationalized interstate wars have risen sharply from 2
to 22 per year. Overall, 54 distinct conflicts have taken place in 2019 – with no other year since 1946
having recorded a higher number of conflicts per year.
2.2 Human costs
First and foremost, let’s keep in mind the high levels of human fatalities generated by conflict. Aside
of deaths of combatants, a specificity of civil conflicts pertains to the high vulnerability of civilian
populations and the high prevalence of sexual violence (Cohen (2013)). Between 1945 and 1999 an
estimated 16.2 million people have perished in 127 civil wars (Fearon and Laitin (2003)), and according
to Ghobarah et al. (2003), on average, for each person killed in a civil war, there is one additional
indirect fatality due to e.g. disrupted health services, diseases, food insecurity, contaminated water,
etc. By way of comparison, since 1945 an estimated 3.3 million people got killed in 25 interstate wars
(Fearon and Laitin (2003)). Further, taking into account all types of political violence (also purges
and mass killings, not just civil wars), Bae and Ott (2008) compute even bigger numbers: "The 20th
century is replete with incidents of civilian killings by the state. Conflict-related deaths in that century
were put at 109.7 million or 4.35 % of the world population" (p.107). A large-scale deleterious impact
1The insightful survey of Ray and Esteban (2017) studies the opposition direction of causality, namely investigating
the impact of poverty and ethnicity on conflict, and, in contrast to the current contribution, does not focus on conflict
traps and the assessment of particular policies.
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of conflicts on civilian populations relates to forced displacements, representing 65.6 million persons in
2016. Over the 2005-2016 period, this amount has increased by a factor of five and more than half of
them being children (UNHCR (2017)).
2.3 Economic costs
The macroeconomic impact of conflicts can be large. When it comes to economic costs in terms of
foregone growth, the survey of Bozzoli et al. (2010) summarizes existing cost estimates of war as
follows: "Mass violent conflicts have a negative effect on annual GDP growth of between one to three
percentage points. Neighboring countries, meanwhile, suffer around one third of the costs that directly
affected conflict countries have to endure. Post-conflict countries can expect a recovery period with
generally higher growth rates than before the war. Some studies find an ongoing recovery over the
medium term, but even these countries do not necessarily catch up completely" (2010: 166).2 Cerra
and Saxena (2008) and Mueller (2012) are among the few papers that assess the macroeconomic costs
of conflicts in a cross-country quantitative framework. Mueller (2012) finds that the average civil war
leads to a permanent loss in output of 18 percent, making civil wars more devastating than economic
crises (financial, banking, currency). According to Collier (2008) the average seven year war lowers
GDP by about 15 percent.
When it comes to prominent evidence for a single country, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find that
GDP per capita in Spain’s Basque Country dropped about 10 percentage points relative to a synthetic
control region without terrorism, and Besley and Mueller (2012) compute a very substantial cost of
conflict for Northern Ireland, with the peace dividend raising house prices by several percentage points.
Concerning the impact of inter-state conflicts on growth, Organski and Kugler (1977) conclude that
major inter-state wars lead to a gap of 10-15% of lower wealth during 15-20 years before catching up.
Following a cost accounting rather than regression approach, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) provide a
cost estimate of the Iraq war corresponding to 3 trillion US Dollars. Glick and Taylor (2010) assess
the trade costs of inter-state wars, finding that war reduces trade by 80% and that this reduction is
persistent (i.e. trade is still reduced by 42% after 5 years). The trade costs of war are estimated to be
about 3% of the permanent GDP flow for major wars (while taking into account also fatality costs
would more than double this estimated cost).
Conflicts exert negative spillovers on the economic development of other countries. At the regional-level,
in the case of Middle-East conflicts (e.g. Irak, Syria), Rother et al. (2016) find that, on average,
countries that border these high-intensity conflicts (e.g. Jordan) experience an annual decline of 1.4
percentage points in their GDP. Part of the spillover is channelized by the aforementioned well-studied
violence-driven disruption of international trade (Martin et al. (2008a), Martin et al. (2008b) and Glick
and Taylor (2010)). A striking example of a global negative spillover of violence has been studied by
Besley et al. (2015); they show that the 2008 surge of attacks by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean
2Smith (2014) and Hoeffler (2017) provide other surveys of this literature.
3
led to a 8%-12% increase in shipping costs and an estimated world welfare loss of 630 USD millions.
2.4 The shadow costs of containing violence: "Si vis pacem, para bellum"!
The economic burden of conflict and violence is not limited to actual war outbreaks. The containment
and prevention of fighting has substantial costs. According to the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (https://data.worldbank.org), an average country currently spends slightly above 2 percent
of its GDP for military expenditures. For illustration, take the example of the astronomical costs of
major powers around the world maintaining an arsenal of nuclear missiles. These are not meant to
be ever actually used but constitute a costly deterrence device. This logic is in line with a series of
game-theoretic models of politics and conflict where war is –at least for a range of parameter values–
an off-equilibrium threat point that does not materialize in equilibrium but still affects a variety of
choices to prevent it (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001); Laurent-Lucchetti et al. (2019)).
In addition to these tangible monetary costs, in countries with draft or militia armies, one needs to
take into account the opportunity cost of time not spent for production. In Switzerland, which has
a general draft for young men, the accounting cost in the budget would typically underestimate the
actual cost of maintaining the armed forces, as also the opportunity cost of time of those enrolled would
have to flow into the equation. This opportunity cost of time is of course much larger in countries that
are actually at war, given that a much larger share of population is drafted.
We are not aware of any academic paper that attempts to assess these shadow costs of containing
violence in a quantitative setup –a very challenging task given its "off-equilibrium path" flavor. One
unfortunate consequence of this lack of credible estimates of shadow costs is that in survey articles and
policy documents the overall costs of conflicts are (potentially severely) under-estimated.
However, indirect estimates of the order of magnitude of such shadow costs draw a bleak picture.
Accounting exercises factoring in the public and private expenditures required to contain, prevent and
deal with the consequences of violence suggests massive costs at the world level, as large as US$ 14.7
trillion PPP in 2017, roughly 12.4% of the world GDP (IEP, 2018). Similarly, the costs of Humanitarian
assistance targeting conflict responses and post-conflict reconstruction are large and have been rising
over the last two decades –representing the majority of overall assistance. Note that total funding
requirements for humanitarian action in 2016 reached US22.1 billion, with 86 percent of total requests
for UN humanitarian assistance targeting conflict zones.3
3 The main channels through which conflict affects development
Beyond the aforementioned aggregate costs, we study in this section through what mechanisms wars




development slowdown is important to guide policy measures in a post-conflict environment. In
particular, assessing the temporality is key because some wars continue to deploy effects long after
fighting has ceased while, for other conflicts, the economic and social recovery can be surprisingly fast.
3.1 Physical destruction and infrastructure
Physical destruction during war has only been studied by a handful of papers, mostly with the
purpose of using conflict as a natural experiment for testing theories of economic growth and economic
geography. The overall punchline of this literature is that destroyed buildings can be reconstructed,
and that physical destruction does not have lasting consequences (contrary to destruction of human
and social capital, as discussed below). These studies look at historical episodes of reconstruction in a
given country and exploit spatial variations in the intensity of destruction across areas (e.g. cities)
as exogenous shocks on post-war indicators of local development (e.g. city size). For example, the
influential paper by Davis and Weinstein (2002) on post-1945 Japan find evidence of mean reversion in
the sense that most cities returned to their relative position in the distribution of city sizes within
about 15 years (Davis and Weinstein, 2002). In the same vein, Brakman et al. (2004) look at post-1945
Germany and detect no long-term impact on city growth in West Germany. Interestingly, they find a
negative and persistent impact in East Germany. They impute this contrast to the fundamental role
played by economic and political institutions in post-war reconstruction, a point that we will discuss
further below in the section dedicated to reconstruction policies. In another context, Miguel and
Roland (2011) find that while the large-scale bombing campaign of Vietnam had a huge humanitarian
cost in the short-run, they do not detect any local poverty traps in the long run. An important
distinction is pointed out by Collier (1999) who argues that the extent of destruction strongly depends
on the structure of the economy: War-vulnerable sectors are the ones that are intensive in transactions
and assets, while sectors featuring only very limited transactions and assets, such as e.g. subsistence
farming, are more likely to recover quickly.
In short, economic loss due to physical capital destruction can be substantial but is temporary. To some
extent, this conclusion comes at no surprise: There is a widespread consensus among economists and
historians that the period of high growth in the aftermath of the second World War was mostly due to
a catch-up effect of countries that experienced severe physical capital loss on their territory ("Trentes
Glorieuses" in France, the German "Wirtschaftswunder", the spectacular Japanese post-war economic
recovery, the "boom economico" in Italy, etc.). This conclusion is also in line with the macroeconomic
growth literature that quantifies the speed of conditional convergence in models of physical/human
capital accumulation and typically predicts this kind of catch-up (see the seminal contributions by
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995)).
3.2 Impact of war on institutions and the social fabric
Social and institutional legacies of conflict, despite being "arguably the most important", remain the
"least understood of all war impacts" (Blattman and Miguel (2010)). As highlighted above, wars
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–at least in the short-run– destroy physical infrastructure. It is quite intuitive that this could harm
state capacity, as if for example a hospital or administration building gets targeted by bombing, the
state’s means of carrying out its missions get harmed. At the same time, a substantial literature from
economics and other social science disciplines has found that states in war are obliged to build up
a strong army machinery and in this way external threats and wars can also trigger investments in
state capacity, as stressed by Tilly (2017) and Voigtländer and Voth (2012b) –most of their supportive
evidence being based on European history. As far as Africa is concerned, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson
(2013) do not detect any effect of conflict fostering future state building and political centralization.
Beyond state capacity, a sizable series of papers looks at the consequences of wars on meta-level social
structures, reaching mixed conclusions. Some evidence supports the view that conflict can result
in heightened political participation and fostered local collective action (Bellows and Miguel (2009),
Blattman (2009), and Gilligan et al. (2014)). By contrast, military intervention from external countries
is associated with very different effects: Kocher et al. (2011) and Dell and Querubin (2018) show that
US bombing in Vietnam weakened local governance, reduced non-communist civic engagement, and
shifted local control in favor of the Viet Cong insurgents. There is also a fair amount of research (based
on experiments and observational data) on the impact of warfare on trust and social capital at the
individual-level. There, too, results are contrasted and Bauer et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive
survey and a meta-analysis for navigating into this large literature. Importantly, several studies find
that conflicts tend to increase parochial altruism and in-group trust within communities (Voors et al.
(2012), Gilligan et al. (2014), Cacault et al. (2015)) and deplete generalized trust, especially out-group
trust between communities (Rohner et al. (2013a), Cassar et al. (2013), Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2014)).
All these intangible elements are key long-run determinants of growth and development – social capital
and trust in particular (Algan and Cahuc (2010)). Moreover, designing policies and interventions
aiming at reconstructing or fostering inter-group trust is not straightforward, as suggested by the
literature on the historical persistence of anti-semitism, inter-group grievances and military rivalries
(Goertz and Diehl (1993); Voigtländer and Voth (2012a); Fouka and Voth (2013)). Thus, in many cases
the depletion of social capital after a war is likely to have long-standing consequences on development.
However, as discussed further below, enduring distrust and grievances are not a fatality and some
policy measures have led to promising results.
Finally, forced migration is a channel through which conflicts are likely to impact the social fabric of
society. As discussed above, millions of people are displaced each year from their home regions due to
interstate wars, civil conflicts, and natural disasters –a phenomenon already present at various points
in history (think e.g. of the so-called "Migration Period" or of the mass population movements after
WWII), and still common today (e.g. Syrian civil war refugees, Rohingya expelled from Myanmar).
There exists a small and expanding literature studying the long-run impact of conflict-driven migration
on development (Becker et al. (2020) for a key contribution) that points towards massive quantitative
effects. Actually, even relatively short historical episodes may have long lasting effects, among others
through inducing migration. For example, Ochsner (2017) studies the economic consequences of the
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Red Army’s misdeeds in 1945 in Southern Austria (dismantling, pillaging and sexual crimes). He looks
at differences in spatial economic activity across the arbitrarily drawn and only for 74 days lasting
liberation demarcation line between the Red Army and the Western Allies. His RDD results show that
the Red Army occupation is associated with a relative population decline by around 26 to 31 percent
and a drop in labor productivity more than 70 years after, a first-order driver of persistence being
selective migration pattern across the demarcation line.
3.3 Destruction of human capital
One particularly important consequence of warfare exposure is that schooling gets in many cases partly
or fully suspended, with wide-ranging and long-lasting consequences. In particular, several papers find
that fighting substantially reduces human capital accumulation (Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011),
Shemyakina (2011); Verwimp and Van Bavel (2013); Leon (2012)). This contrasts, though, with the
impact of interstate conflicts. It has been found that, at the same time, international military rivalries
can drive up education investments (Aghion et al. (2019)).
Further, a recent literature focuses on the impact of Jewish persecution during WWII as a shock to
the human capital and the skill composition of the population. Acemoglu et al. (2011) document that,
within Russia, cities that experienced the Holocaust most intensely have worse economic and political
outcomes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this lasting impact of the Holocaust being partly
attributable to a permanent change in the social structure (i.e. size of the middle class). Waldinger
(2016) finds that while scientist exodus during World War II had persistent negative effects, the actual
bombing of German cities had no lasting impact. In particular, a 10 percent shock to physical capital
reduced output by 0.05 SD in the short run, and the reduction did not persist. Akbulut-Yuksel and
Yuksel (2015) find that German children who were of school age during the persecution of Jews have
fewer years of schooling in adulthood, and are less likely to have finished high school or gone to college.
Importantly, war does not only directly affect human capital through the destruction of educational
facilities and the like, but it also indirectly hinders human capital accumulation, both through economic
deprivation (as discussed above) and through the impact of war exposure on health and behavior, as
discussed right below in the next subsection.
3.4 The impact of war on health and behavior
There is a further array of individual-level effects of war exposure. Crucially, there are negative health
impacts: Bedard and Deschênes (2006), Akresh et al. (2012b), Akresh et al. (2012a) and Minoiu and
Shemyakina (2014) show that war-exposed children suffer from adverse health effects, both in the
short- and long-run, with economic losses being an important channel through which armed conflict
negatively impacts child health. In the same vain, Barenbaum et al. (2004) and Derluyn et al. (2004)
find that wars have adverse consequences on mental and psychological health.
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Another important dimension is how war exposure early in life affects future behavior later in the
life cycle. Miguel and Roland (2011), Cecchi et al. (2016) and Couttenier et al. (2019) show that
conflict exposure leads to a higher propensity for competitive, aggressive or violent behavior later in
life. It has also been found that army enlistment can favor political radicalization and aversion to
peace building, at least in extreme circumstances. In particular, Vlachos (2016) has found a political
radicalization effect for forced conscription to the German army for men from Eastern France during
WWII, and Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016) shows that individual conflict exposure reduces the support for
peace building in Israel.
4 War Traps
4.1 Evidence on vicious cycles of war recurrence
Wars tend to recur in ever the same countries, and past wars are strong predictors of future wars.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that, in the post-1945 period, two thirds of all conflict outbreaks take
place in countries where multiple civil conflicts were recorded; Derouen and Bercovitch (2008) document
that more than three quarters of all civil conflicts stem from enduring rivalries among ethnic groups
that repeatedly enter into conflicts with each other. As shown in Rohner et al. (2013b), persistence of
conflict is still detected even when controlling for country fixed effects. Thus, war recurrence is unlikely
to be solely due to persistent triggers (say, natural resource abundance) and logics of self-reinforcing
dynamics are likely drivers of persistence – a war today is planting the seeds for war tomorrow – unless
policies are put in place to break such war traps.
Several vicious cycles may drive persistence of civil conflict. Conceptually, we can think of two
categories of cycles: (i) A positive feedback loop between war and poverty where economics and
politics are intertwined (e.g. poverty and violence mutually reinforcing each other); (ii) a positive
feedback loop from current conflicts on future conflicts where political motives (e.g. grievances) become
"autonomous" drivers of the perpetuation of violence and economic interests are not central anymore.
One immediate implication is that the diagnosis of the nature of the vicious cycle is essential for
calibrating the development policy response. Indeed, in the case of the second, politics-only, type of
vicious cycle, interventions targeting only economic objectives tend to be particularly inefficient: Not
only they are inoperative at bringing back peace, but they are also more at risk of not reaching their
primary objectives because their full effects are heavily constrained by the perpetuation of violence.
As argued below, some political measures (e.g. institutionalized power-sharing) can help preventing
the self-perpetuation of these "autonomous" non-economic vicious cycles of mounting inter-group
grievances.
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4.2 Feedback loop – Poverty to future conflict
The war-poverty trap takes place when political problems self-perpetuate because of poverty/economic
issues. To simplify, conflicts are the political manifestation of under-development, while in turn
under-development is the economic manifestation of conflicts. We discuss below a couple of mechanisms
explaining why the nexus between poverty and war features a bi-directional causality such that conflicts
fuel poverty and, in turn, economic deprivation is a powerful breeding ground for future conflicts.
Mechanism 1: From poverty to conflict. We have already discussed the abundant evidence on
conflict harming economic growth and development. Thus, we now survey the empirical literature
interested in the other direction of causality, namely from poverty to conflict (see also the survey of
Ray and Esteban (2017)). In the early studies, based on country-level data, several concerns about
identification issues were raised as exemplified by the discussions on weather-related instrumental
variables in Dell et al. (2014) and Burke et al. (2015). Some results were unstable, even with conflicting
findings between studies on the impact of commodity price shocks on conflict outbreak (Brückner and
Ciccone (2010) and Bazzi and Blattman (2014) ). This state of affairs led some scholars to question
the validity of the relationship between poverty and conflict (Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010)).
Recent data-related improvements settled most of this empirical controversy. Causal analysis is now
often based on unexpected income shocks at the subnational-level. Following the seminal contribution
by Miguel et al. (2004), a frequently used source of exogenous variations corresponds to adverse
weather conditions that are clearly associated, in the data, with a reduction of economic growth and
an increase in fighting (Hidalgo et al. (2010), Dell (2012), Hsiang et al. (2013), König et al. (2017), and
Vanden Eynde (2018)). An alternative exogenous source of income variations is the one induced by
commodity price fluctuations. In particular, Dube and Vargas (2013) find that a drop in coffee prices
in Columbia puts pressure on wages and can induce conflict events. In line with this, Berman et al.
(2017b) show that spikes in fertilizer prices can increase the likelihood of conflict.
Two main channels have been envisioned for interpreting these empirical regularities. The first one
relates to the opportunity cost of fighting and basically states that individuals trade-off the economic
returns to violence against opportunity costs. The second one emphasizes how economic deprivation
harms state capacity. The two channels have been perceived as observationally equivalent by many
researchers, with adverse income shocks significantly and substantially increasing the risk of conflict in
both cases. Though challenging, the question of disentangling these two channels is important because
their policy implications differ drastically (i.e. targeting populations vs infrastructures). Very recently,
McGuirk and Burke (2017) have made substantial progress on the question; their findings point toward
the prominent role of the opportunity cost.
In a nutshell, the literature has highlighted both an effect of, on the one hand, war causing impover-
ishment and, on the other hand, poverty fueling social tensions and political violence. We expect a
series of vicious cycles linked to conflict and economic deprivation (and their covariates, such as low
social and human capital) mutually reinforcing each other. Such vicious cycles can result in enduring
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war-poverty traps.
Mechanism 2: Conflict-human capital/health nexus. Low education (Rohner and Saia (2019))
and precarious health conditions (Cervellati et al. (2017)) can be powerful drivers of conflict. Because
war exposure drives down both human capital and health indicators (see section 3), this can lead to a
"human capital/health – conflict" vicious cycle. Again, the logic is similar to the first mechanism above
– war harms the economic potential, this time by destroying education and physical health, which leads
to a depletion of human capital. In turn, reduced human capital has been found to increase the risk
of conflicts, both due to lower opportunity costs of fighting but also through fueling social tensions
and grievances (see De la Briere et al. (2017); Rohner and Saia (2019)), which is the focus of our next
section.
4.3 Feedback loop – Grievances and inter-group trust
In this subsection we develop the notion that the logic of violence can self-perpetuate through grievances,
distrust and activation of latent cleavages (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious). By grievances we
understand perceptions of exclusion (political, economic or social), a sense of injustice and the blaming
on other groups or the state for it, which manifests itself, among others, in distrust between groups.
Economic mechanisms linked to development and human capital are not at the forefront of the vicious
cycles and war traps related to grievances. This obviously does not deny any role to poverty in these
cycles, but it simply implies that beyond purely economic factors, a series of social and political
mechanisms are at work and that breaking such war traps requires moving beyond strictly economic
policies.
Put bluntly, the mechanism we have in mind is that inter-group conflict leaves political scarves and
grievances, which may facilitate the mobilization of fighters, fueling the risk of future wars. In terms of
game-theoretic models, these types of vicious cycles of self-perpetuating war have been studied e.g.
in Rohner et al. (2013b); Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014). Rohner et al. (2013b), for example, have
constructed a rational choice model where the outbreak of a war results in lower inter-group trust and
less frequent business relationships; by decreasing the opportunity cost of a war, this, in turn, increases
the likelihood of future violence. This bi-directional relationship can give birth to what one can call a
"social capital – conflict" vicious cycle.
In terms of the empirical evidence, the idea that grievances lead to conflict has been present in political
science for many decades (see e.g. the seminal work of Gurr (1970) and Horowitz (2000)).4 The
activation of grievances can be engineered by elites, e.g. through the mobilization of collective memories,
emotions (anger, frustration), and narratives. While there has been a series of qualitative studies on
the persistence and re-activation of grievances, there still only exists relatively little quantitative work
on this (see e.g. Cederman et al. (2010); Fouka and Voth (2013); Ochsner and Roesel (2017)). This
4See Shesterinina (2016) for a case study of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–93 and a survey of the political science
literature on social structures for civil war mobilization.
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relative lack of quantitative assessment on the activation of grievances is surprising, given how crucial it
is for designing the reconciliation process (on the role of narratives in reconciliation, see next section).5
We foresee here an avenue for future research at the cross-road of the conflict and media literature,
drawing on machine learning and text analysis. Studying how grievances can persist over time, be
re-activated, or be strategically manipulated by group leaders is of paramount importance.
A crucial factor can be horizontal inequalities between groups: The persistence and re-activation of
grievances is often facilitated by the presence of economic disparities across groups (Fearon and Laitin
(2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Østby (2013); Huber and Mayoral; Stewart (2016)). This implies
that economic and redistribution policies can help in curbing the grievance feedback loop on violence.
Up to now the empirical evidence on this is quite slim (see e.g. Crost et al. (2016)) and pursuing this
research question constitutes in our view a fruitful avenue for future work.
Last but not least, a further grievance-related vicious cycle is plausible: Namely, wars often imply the
calling of a state of emergency suspending parts of constitutional rights and fighting frequently often
entails violations of civil liberties and political rights. In turn, as discussed below, the lack of rule of
law and of democratic political processes can be a powerful driver of grievances and insurgency. The
resulting type of "institutional break-down and conflict" vicious cycle constitutes a further mechanism
through which grievance-related war traps can arise.
5 Policies to Break the War Trap
5.1 First principles: Fostering development AND peace
We start the current section by formulating general first principles of how to tackle war traps, before
studying a battery of particular policies. A key point concerns the dual facet of development policy:
Poverty and conflict should be addressed simultaneously, due to the presence of a strong complementarity
between the economic and political objectives. If problems of under-development and political instability
are treated disjointly, this entails a large risk of being stuck in a conflict trap, as argued below. In
particular, it would be a mistake to believe that the toolkit of anti-poverty policies will mechanically
and automatically translate into a reduction of violence. A fascinating study by Blattman et al.
(2017) illustrates the empirical relevance of this complementarity between policy interventions (at
the individual-level in their paper). In Liberia, they recruited criminally engaged men –incl. former
ex-combatants from two civil wars – and randomized a cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster
a battery of non-cognitive skills. They also randomized $200 grants. Their results point toward a
reinforcement effect: While the effects of cash alone and therapy alone dissipate over time, they find
that, when cash followed therapy, crime and violence decrease dramatically for at least a year. Thus, if
just disbursing cash does not suffice, the key question becomes what the most promising policies are
5A likely reason for this lack of empirical works on the question is that the first generation of empirical studies
dismissed the role of grievances. In particular, the seminal study by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) finds that evidence
on participation to conflict is more consistent with explanations based on economic motives rather than on grievances.
We advocate for a re-examination of the question at the light of the now-available large micro-level datasets.
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that can simultaneously foster development and peace? Let us start with discussing some examples of
successful versus unsuccessful policies before setting up a simple formal model.
Policy macro-complementarity There is no doubt that a well-designed development program
can curb poverty and violence. International trade is an area where this dual facet of development
policy ("economics-politics") has been long recognized. In the aftermath of WWII, the construction
of the European Union was based on the dual purpose of pacifying Western Europe and promoting
economic reconstruction in an impoverished Europe. As shown by Martin et al. (2012), this logic
explains the signature of many FTAs across the world since 1945 – the reverse of the medal is that e.g.
the US-China trade war is both an economic and geopolitical conflict. These reconstruction efforts
after WWII were mirrored in the Marshall plan aiming at restoring production capacities in Europe.
As discussed above, this productive investment has been followed by an unprecedented economic boom
of 30 years with growing human capital, surging wages and a historically long span of peace in Europe.
A similar example of a policy aiming at raising human capital and productive efficiency has been
the INPRES school construction program in Indonesia in the 1970s, leading to a historical boost
in educational attainment. While the primary purpose of the program was to raise human capital,
productive capacities and wages, it achieved the "double dividend" of not only fostering economic
advancement but also curbing conflict (Rohner and Saia (2019)). Interestingly, many of the desirable
consequences of the program –both in terms of economic and political outcomes– have increasingly
surged over many years, not just affecting the first but also second generations of pupils.
One common feature of the aforementioned policies generating a powerful macro-complementarity
between development and peace is that they aim at fostering development not by disbursing one-off
cash but by promoting long-run productive capacity, e.g. through human capital investments or the
building up of trade networks or production joint ventures. We shall revisit this feature in the simple
formal model below.
Policies that backfire By contrast, policies that fail at addressing jointly the two facets of poverty
and political conflict may backfire. Examples are manifold of potentially counter-productive aid policies
when they are detached from local knowledge and do not take into account ground conditions and local
ethnic politics. In a fascinating and controversial paper Nunn and Qian (2014) causally find that an
increase in US food aid may raise the incidence of armed civil conflict in recipient countries. Although
their macro-level analysis prevents them from an in-depth investigation of the channels, they provide
substantial evidence that aid stealing by the fighting groups is likely to be the main driving force of
their findings. Interestingly, they detect no effect of food aid on conflict in countries without a recent
history of civil conflict. This means that a given policy can work well in a set of peaceful countries,
but transposing it without adaptation to a context of conflict may result in worse outcomes. In other
words, ill-designed development policy can be detrimental to peace in contexts with latent cleavages
where the country is already trapped in a poverty-violence spiral.
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Related to this, Crost et al. (2014) document how insurgents in the Philippines have sabotaged a large
World Bank funded development program because its prospective success could have weakened their
support in the population. Their RDD estimations point towards an increase in insurgent-initiated
incidents in the early stages of program preparation. Quite surprisingly, it is because the program is
potentially successful that it was actually sabotaged, leading in this context to a positive correlation
between foreign aid and conflict. One lesson from this is that state capacity and the means to guarantee
public security can be necessary pre-conditions for some types of policies.
Similar results have been found e.g. in Weintraub (2016), Wood and Molfino (2016), Sexton (2016);
for a literature survey see Findley (2018). Strikingly, these countervailing effects of aid have typically
most often been detected in contexts where one major consequence of a policy intervention has been
to increase the overall amount of lootable financial liquidities in a given region, without affecting
individual returns to productive activities. Drawing on this pattern, De la Briere et al. (2017) have
advocated to invest mineral rents in human capital rather than in appropriable financial assets.
While the World Bank is aware of this dual aspect of development policy (World Bank (2018)),
(unsurprisingly) there are only few quantitative evaluations of pacification policies and post-conflict
interventions. This is a pervasive problem in the political economy literature; magnified here by the fact
that implementing RCTs is notoriously difficult in a violent context. Collecting further, well-identified
empirical evidence on the impact on conflict of various anti-poverty policies constitutes a fruitful avenue
for future work.
5.2 A simple model on the economics and politics complementarity
Before zooming in on particular promising policies, we want to take one step back and formalize in
an extremely simple setting the main forces at work. Formal models of contest have been developed
already several decades ago (see e.g. Hirshleifer (2001) and the survey of Konrad et al. (2009)), but
have only quite rarely been linked to particular economic policies. An exception is the theoretical
paper by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) that illustrates how conflict exerts a social constraint to policy
analysis: They show how a (first best) desirable economic policy in times of peace may turn to be
detrimental in reality because of its impact on conflict.
In what follows, we consider (without any claim of novelty) the simplest possible workhorse model
of contest from this literature and illustrate in this extremely simple and transparent setting the
contrasting effects of particular anti-poverty policies that may promote peace or backfire. Consider a
framework where two risk-neutral players (groups), A and B, fight to appropriate a "prize" R. Each
player i ∈ {A,B} optimally allocates its effort between a productive activity paid at a market price
w (e.g. farming) and fighting for R (e.g. rents from natural resources) under the time constraint
li + fi = 1 where li and fi stand for the time dedicated to laboring and fighting respectively. Fighting
success of i –to be interpreted as its probability of victory or alternatively the appropriated share of






where the non-negative ρ’s capture fighting efficiencies of A and B. The payoff function of i is given by
πi(fi, f−i) = Pi(fi, f−i)×R+ (1− fi)× w (2)







where B ≡ ρAρB
( ρA+ρB2 )2
. This parameter captures the balance of fighting power between the two players;
it lies between 0 (fully unbalanced) and 1 (fully balanced). A well-know feature of the contest success
function setup is that fighting efforts increase with the balance of power –a direct consequence of
strategic interactions. More importantly for our purpose, we see that more fighting takes place when
the prize is larger (high R) and when the opportunity cost of fighting is small (low w).
Aggregate welfare is given by W ≡ πA+πB = R+ 2w− (fA+fB)w. In words, the welfare loss attached
to conflict stems from the fact that aggregate violence (i.e. total fighting effort fA + fB) diverts labor
from production to appropriation. Note that in a slightly more evolved setting, one could add further
direct costs of conflict by adding a term consisting of multiplying fighting efforts with some linear
destruction cost d; however, this would not affect our main conclusions (but would simply reduce
somewhat the equilibrium fighting efforts).
Combined with equation (3), we obtain that the equilibrium level of welfare is given by
W∗ = R+ 2w −B × R2 (4)
The social optimum is reached when the welfare loss is minimized. This corresponds to a case where a
benevolent social-planer imposes a peaceful arrangement where the rent is shared between the two
players with no fighting (i.e. the limit case fA = fB ≈ 0). In that case
Wpeace = R+ 2w (5)
Let us assume that a development agency has to decide between allocating an amount ∆ of aid towards
increasing the rent (i.e. R+ ∆) or towards increasing labor income (i.e. w + ∆/2, as the amount is
divided between the two groups). If the agency is able to enforce peace, then it is indifferent between
the two policies. But if peace cannot be maintained, then the policies have drastically diverging
consequences on fighting incentives and welfare. The rent-oriented policy (e.g. disbursing cash without
any support or program attached) exacerbates violence (see equation 3), there is some crowding out of
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production such that the resulting increase in aggregate welfare represents only a fraction (1−B/2)
of the initial aid (see equation 4). By contrast, the productivity-enhancing policy (e.g. entailing the
promotion of trade or human capital) will reduce violence and its benefits will be fully transmitted to
aggregate welfare. In words, the economic facet of development policy must factor in the social and
political constraints linked to conflict. Ignoring this macro-complementarity between economics and
politics leads to mis-calibrated policies that can have a detrimental impact on violence.
What does this mean in terms of the aforementioned anti-poverty policies? When policies aim to
tackle under-development by distributing one-off aid, a main effect can be to increase R, thereby
triggering additional fighting effort, which could crowd-out at least partly the initial positive effect
of cash injection. In contrast, when policies aim at fostering productive capacity, e.g. by increasing
human capital, and eventually also wages w, this leads to a higher opportunity cost of appropriation
and is hence expected to lead to the "double dividend" of reduced poverty and reduced fighting.
These straightforward implications of a canonical contest model have, surprisingly, only rarely been
confronted within a unified empirical test. One exception is Dube and Vargas (2013) who show that in
Colombia a boom in the labor-intense coffee industry (being associated with higher wages for workers)
has a pacifying effect, while higher oil prices increase the spoils of appropriation and are associated
with greater fighting efforts.
Put in simple terms, one implication is that economic policies should be complemented with political
and institutional interventions that call for a more integrative development with productive investments
in human and physical capital instead of one-off cash payments, and with "no-one left behind" in term
of territories and population segments. If each group in society has promising production perspectives,
the incentives for leaving the labor force to join armed rebel forces are slim.6
In what follows, we briefly highlight a series of particular policies that have been found promising
to promote peace, by increasing the opportunity cost of conflict, improving institutional quality, and
attenuating grivances.
5.3 Policies that increase the opportunity cost of conflict
Labor Market Access A recent study by Blattman and Annan (2016) experimentally shows for
Liberian ex-fighters that the persistence of violence can be attenuated by economic opportunities. In
line with this evidence, Couttenier et al. (2019) find that adult asylum seekers who have been exposed
during childhood to civil conflict and/or mass killing in their origin country, tend to perpetrate more
violent crimes in Switzerland; crucially, this deleterious effect vanishes almost entirely for those who
are granted an access to the Swiss labor market.
6For the incentives of left-behind individuals and groups to engage in enduring fighting, see Esteban et al. (2012, 2020)
and the literature cited therein.
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Education and Human Capital Schooling construction has been found to be a major peace-
promoting force in Rohner and Saia (2019). This paper exploits arguably exogenous variation in the
intensity of the INPRES school construction during the 1970s in Indonesia, finding that a one standard
deviation increase in schools built (1.25 more schools per 1000 school-aged children) results in a drop
of a quarter of the baseline conflict risk.
Weapons embargo Restricting the access to weapons through Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and
international embargoes could be another policy that makes engaging in fighting more costly. There
exists indeed ample evidence that weapons availability fuels violence (Dube et al. (2013); Benson
and Ramsay (2016); Hultman and Peksen (2017); Gallea et al. (2019)). One caveat concerns the
implementation: While weapons embargoes are seen as less costly for the general population compared
to general trade sanctions, it has been found that they are typically not easy to enforce (Moore (2010)).
5.4 Policies that improve institutional quality
Role of democracy and power-sharing There is a substantial body of evidence that sound
institutions and mature democracy reduce considerably the scope for conflict (see e.g. Hegre (2001);
Besley and Persson (2011); Laurent-Lucchetti et al. (2019)). In line with the argumentation above,
Collier and Rohner (2008) have found indeed a macro-complementarity between development and
democracy, with the conflict-reducing effect of democracy above all present for higher levels of
development.
Breaking the natural resource curse The literature linking natural resources to conflict ranges
far back (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Mehlum et al. (2006); Morelli
and Rohner (2015); Berman et al. (2017a)). Importantly, detrimental political instability effects of
resource abundance are not a fatality, as good institutions can make sure that natural resources are a
blessing and not a curse (Mehlum et al. (2006)). As far as specific mining characteristics are concerned,
Berman et al. (2017a) find that transparency / traceability initiatives and corporate social responsibility
are key ramparts against potentially harmful impacts of the mining industry on peace.
5.5 Policies that attenuate grievances
As shown in Cilliers et al. (2016), truth and reconciliation processes can foster reconciliation and
strengthen social capital, but at the price of worsened psychological health. As stressed by Cantoni et al.
(2017), school curricula can affect people’s beliefs and attitudes, and may play a role in reconciliation
processes, which could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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5.6 Policy Evaluation
Our reading of the literature shows that the evaluation of policy interventions in conflict and post-
conflict contexts is still in its infancy. One obvious reason is that the frontier toolkit for evidence-based
policy evaluation (e.g. Randomized Control Trials) is notoriously hard to implement when violence
is pervasive. We believe that future studies should try to tackle this challenge. Indeed, our previous
discussion on the macro-complementarity between economic and political objectives suggests that the
lessons drawn from interventions (and their evaluations) designed in a peaceful context should be
transposed with great caution into a conflictual environment. In other words, the optimal design of
anti-poverty policies in peace and in war may drastically differ.
A powerful way of addressing this challenge is to set up and estimate structural models of conflict
and development that allow for quantifying counterfactual policy interventions. Following such an
approach can yield additional insights as the structural estimation toolkit is able to deal with general
equilibrium effects and assess non-linear effects of policy changes of variable magnitude, contrary
to Randomized Control Trials (RCT), Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) etc. Thus, it seems
important to complement pure theory and reduced-form estimation with structural models englobing
both theory and empirics, especially given the two-way causation between conflict and development.
This methodology has so far only rarely been used in the economics of conflict. There exist though a
few exceptions of recent papers making first steps in this direction. Esteban et al. (2012) start out
from a model of contest to derive predictions on indicators of diversity and inequality that are directly
taken to the data. König et al. (2017) structurally estimate a contest-network model using data of the
Second Congo War, which allows to predict the impact of keyplayer removal, embargoes and bilateral
pacification between armed groups (see also the recent related paper of Amarasinghe et al. (2020)).
Following a trend similar to the one observed recently in other fields (e.g. labor economics or trade),
we expect structural estimations to become useful additions to the toolkit in the conflict literature in
the coming years.
6 Conclusions
From the above discussion arise several conclusions. One key reason why conflict is still often overlooked
as major factor in development policies is that, conflict costs are often under-estimated, as shadow
costs of costly deterrence spending are typically disregarded by policy makers. Once the true costs of
political tensions are taken into account, anti-poverty measures are more likely to adequately take into
consideration their impact on political stability. This would typically shift the focus away from one-off
cash transfers to longer-run investments in human capital, sound institutions and productive capacities.
While the former (cash) constitutes spoils to appropriate, the latter (increased productive capabilities)
raises wages and drives up the opportunity cost of leaving the work force to join an armed group.
Moreover, there exists a series of conflict traps, some related to vicious cycles and poverty, and others
linked to the persistence and activation of grievances. In order to break these conflict traps, policies
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need to address jointly both poverty and social tensions, as there exists a strong macro complementarity
between the two. Policies that only focus on poverty or only on conflict are in many cases doomed to
fail, and the most promising policy measures typically both advance peace and development at the
same time. The idea that development policies should be combined with conflict-prevention is now
well rooted in the doctrine of the international agencies, as testified by the joint United Nations-World
Bank initiative on "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict". Still,
the macro-complementarities highlighted in the current paper are not well-enough understood yet and
the particular policies proposed above are still under-used.
In terms of an outlook of the evolution of this literature, we expect machine learning and geographical
information systems to play an increasingly important role. Digitally-driven data design, geo-localized
data and remote sensing data, machine learning, web scrapping and text analysis will all constitute
increasingly helpful tools to generate novel data to answer novel research questions. Beyond this
evolution of the data collection tools, we also predict a return of theory and an increasing importance
of external validity considerations. While exploiting exogenous variation around some small scale
thresholds in well-defined micro-settings can be extremely valuable and insightful, they need to be
combined with larger scale studies that cover larger areas and that are micro-founded in theory. In
many contexts –and this is our fourth and last major conclusion– structurally estimated quantitative
models can play a useful role.
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